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Abstract: The dynamic ﬁscal policy adjustment of local jurisdictions is investigated empirically using
a panel of more than 1000 U.S. municipalities over a quarter of a century. Distinguishing own revenue,
grants, expenditures, and debt service, the analysis is carried out using a vector error-correction model
which takes account of the intertemporal budget constraint. The results indicate that a large part of the
adjustment in response to ﬁscal imbalances takes place by oﬀsetting changes in future expenditures. In
addition, the results point to an important role of grants in maintaining budget balance as ﬁscal imbalances
resulting from lower revenues and higher expenditures including debt service are to a signiﬁcant extent
ﬁnanced by subsequent increases in grants. Decompositions of the sample according to average city
population and initial debt burden reveal signiﬁcant diﬀerences across subsamples. In particular, the role
of grants in maintaining budget balance is much more pronounced for large cities as well as for cities with
a high debt burden.
JEL-Classiﬁcation: H70, H72, H77
yWe are grateful to R. Graycarek for assistance with this research. Much of this work was undertaken while the ﬁrst
author was a postdoctoral scholar at the University of Kentucky, whose support is gratefully acknowledged.1 Introduction
Our goal in this paper is to shed new light on the dynamics of local government policymaking, with
speciﬁc reference to the ﬁscal policies of municipal governments in the United States. The US federation,
of which local governments are an important part, is a durable institutional structure which decentralizes
signiﬁcant portions of public-sector decisionmaking authority to subnational governments. Governments
at all levels within this structure operate under a variety of constraints, and these constraints create the
incentives that, in part, elicit the observed behavior of policymakers. The ﬁscal policies of subnational
governments are important in themselves, but they also illuminate the nature of the constraints which
these governments face and thus the institutional structure of the public sector itself.
Local governments in the US are numerous, diverse, and economically important.1 The services performed
by these governments, their ﬁnancing, and their relationships with the national and state governments have
evolved over time in a complex process involving the interplay of all branches of government (executive,
legislative, and judicial) at all levels of government (federal, state, and local), all against the background of
ongoing demographic, technological, economic, and social change and widely-varying local circumstances.
Policymakers at the local level face conﬂicting demands: resident households and local businesses demand
public services, public employees demand higher compensation and better working conditions, and tax-
payers want lower taxes. These and other interests impose political constraints on local policymakers. In
addition, local governments face market constraints. For example, they may be able to borrow money to
ﬁnance expenditures in excess of revenues, but their ability to borrow is constrained by the need to pay
competitive interest rates and to maintain creditworthiness. The policymakers in one locality may target
particular groups of households or businesses for favorable or unfavorable ﬁscal treatment, but the free
movement of people and enterprises among jurisdictions means that such policies may cause entry into or
exit from the locality, limiting the ability of policymakers to meet the demands of one group by imposing
1The Bureau of the Census publishes a quinquennial Census of Governments. As of the 1997 census, there were over
3,000 counties, almost 20,000 municipalities, almost 35,000 special districts, almost 14,000 school districts, and almost 17,000
townships, making almost 90,000 units of local government in total. Total public expenditure by all localities amounted
to $837 billion, of which municipalities – the focus of the present analysis – accounted for $275B, school districts $257B,
counties $198B, special districts $89B, and townships $28B. Total local government spending in 1997 amounted to some 10.1
% of GDP. In 1995 local government spending amounted to 26.9 % of all public expenditures in the US.
1burdens on another. Often, higher-level governments provide ﬁnancial assistance to local governments in
the form of intergovernmental grants; these transfers may ease some of the budgetary constraints facing
local policymakers, although sometimes ﬁscal transfers are accompanied by additional constraints, for
example in the form of mandates to provide particular services or to adhere to other regulations.
Occasionally – but rarely, in US experience – local ﬁscal policies result in crises in which a government’s
ﬁnancial obligations to creditors, vendors, and employees cannot be met from existing revenues. In such
situations, local authorities, as units of government subordinate to states, are often subjected to special
oversight mechanisms even as the state government assists the locality with additional funding to meet its
most pressing contractual and public-service delivery obligations. The ﬁnancial crises of New York City
in the 1970s and of Philadelphia, Orange County, California, and Washington DC in the 1990s provide
well-known examples of local ﬁscal policies gone awry, and smaller localities also encounter ﬁscal distress
from time to time.2 These events, though noteworthy, are nonetheless exceptions to the rule. Somehow,
despite (or perhaps in part because of) the conﬂicting demands imposed upon them by taxpayers, interest
groups, creditors, vendors, state governments, and others, local policymakers face an incentive structure
that, in equilibrium, results in behavior that for the most part preserves the ﬁnancial integrity of local
governments. Whether the ﬁscal policies chosen by local governments are economically desirable according
to normative criteria (eﬃciency, equity) is a separate and very important question. Leaving this question
aside, one can observe that the institutional structure of American federalism has created a system of
local governments that pass a basic survival test while permitting a relatively high degree of local ﬁscal
autonomy.
From the perspective of institutional design (or evolution), the ﬁscal behavior of a system of “local”
governments with signiﬁcant policymaking autonomy is a matter of worldwide interest, for several reasons.
First, in numerous developing and transition economies, establishing a new balance of ﬁscal responsibilities
2See GAO (1995) for series of case studies of localities in ﬁscal distress, some ﬁndings of which are summarized in Holloway
(1996a, 1996b). The infrequency of formal municipal bankruptcy proceedings in the US is quite remarkable. Since the passage
of the Municipal Bankruptcy Act in 1937, there have been fewer than 500 bankruptcy ﬁlings. Municipal bankruptcies are
a minuscule fraction of all bankruptcies. Of the total of 1.2 million bankruptcy proceedings commenced in the 12 months
preceding Sept. 30, 2000, 6 were ﬁled under Chapter 9 (the portion of the bankruptcy code governing municipalities). A
large portion of Chapter 9 ﬁlings that do occur are accounted for by small special districts‘ (such as water or sewer districts),
and bankruptcies by municipalities proper are therefore even more rare. See Administrative Oﬃce of the U.S. Courts (2000a,
b, Table F-2)) and National Bankruptcy Review Commission (1997).
2between higher- and lower-level governments has been a major focus of policy debate for the past decade.
Fiscal decentralization has accompanied economic and political reforms in such diverse countries as Russia,
Ukraine, China, India, South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina, to name only a few.3 Since high ﬁscal
deﬁcits often create pressures for accommodating monetary policies that contribute to macroeconomic
instability, the question arises as to whether autonomous subnational governments will undermine overall
ﬁscal discipline, for example through ﬁscal mismanagement that necessitates bailouts from higher-level
governments.4 Very similar questions arise in the context of European monetary union, as exempliﬁed in
the well-known ﬁscal convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty, although, in this context, the “local”
governments are actually the central governments of the member states. Here, too, the question arises
as to whether the institutional structure of the EU, including ﬁscal as well as ﬁnancial linkages between
EU-level entities and lower-level governments with a high degree of ﬁscal autonomy, contains appropriate
incentives for ﬁscal management (see, e.g., McKinnon (1997a, b)).
Since the policymaking context of US municipalities diﬀers enormously from that of subnational govern-
ments in developing and transition economies and from that of the member states of the EU, it would
be erroneous to suggest exact parallels among them. Nevertheless, there are few better opportunities for
systematic statistical analysis of such institutional structures than those aﬀorded by local governments in
the US. First, these governments operate against the backdrop of certain shared fundamental institutions,
such as the constitutional structure of the country, its legal system, and a variety of other historical and
cultural factors, which greatly enhances the comparability of data across jurisdictions. Second, in sharp
contrast to the typical macroeconomic environment where a single country is the sole unit of observation,
lower-level governments oﬀer the potential for a large number of observations. Third, in the US case, this
potential can be realized because of sustained data collection eﬀorts on the part of the US Census. As
described further below, we have been able to assemble a balanced panel of ﬁscal data for more than 1000
municipalities for over a quarter-century. These data have been collected using consistent deﬁnitions and,
though they are of course subject to imperfections, they likely represent the best available collection of
3The ﬁscal aspects of public-sector restructuring in central and eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Latin America,
and South Africa, are discussed in Bird et al. (1995) and Bird and Vaillancourt (1998).
4See, e.g., Prud’homme (1995), Tanzi (1996), Dillinger and Webb (1999), Rodden (1999), and references therein.
3ﬁscal data on such a large number of governmental units.5
Our analysis examines the process of dynamic ﬁscal policy adjustment, utilizing methods that have been
exploited previously in macroeconomic analyses devoted to the study of intertemporal government budget
constraints. One important topic of previous research (e.g., Wilcox, 1989, Trehan and Walsh, 1991) has
been the attempt to verify whether ﬁscal policies are stationary or “sustainable” over time and thus
consistent with long-run budget constraints. Our perspective is somewhat diﬀerent from this, in that we
begin with the presumption of intertemporal budget balance on the part of municipal governments and
focus on the analysis of the nature of the adjustment process that maintains this balance. Suppose, for
example, that municipal spending is increased, such that the local deﬁcit is increased and the ﬁscal balance
is disturbed. Do municipalities with high spending tend to generate additional tax revenues in order to
support this spending? Do they simply run bigger deﬁcits for a period of time, delaying adjustments
in taxes and spending? Does higher spending trigger additional transfers from higher-level governments,
enabling municipalities to maintain higher spending without having to raise local taxes or accumulate local
debt? Or, ﬁnally, is higher spending self-limiting, with high spending in one period followed by spending
restraint in subsequent periods, reducing the need for additional revenues and for additional borrowing?
Any of these types of ﬁscal adjustment, or some combination of all of them, is conceivable, and the same
can be said about possible paths of ﬁscal adjustment in response to ﬁscal imbalances due to innovations
in revenues, grants, or deﬁcits.6
5Numerous studies have examined ﬁscal policymaking at the level of state governments; see, for example, Poterba (1994),
Bohn and Inman (1996), and McCarty and Schmidt (1997). At the municipal level, data on large municipalities are more
readily available and have been a principal subject of previous analyses; see, e.g., Inman (1989). An exception is Holtz-Eakin
et al.(1991) which use a sample of 171 municipalities drawn randomly from the Census of Governments. Large municipalities
are clearly of great importance because they account for a large fraction of total municipal ﬁscal activity, but, as we shall
see below, their behavior diﬀers in signiﬁcant ways from that of smaller cities. In this respect, their behavior is misleading
if taken as a characterization of municipalities as a generic institutional form.
6In common with previous macroeconomic analyses, our analysis examines the dynamic adjustment of government sur-
pluses / deﬁcits. The macroeconomic implications of municipal government debt policy are not a focus of interest here,
however; we are as concerned with the division of dynamic ﬁscal adjustment between revenues and expenditures as with
the net of the two. It should also be noted that most of the “action” in government debt policy in the US occurs at the
Federal level. Combined state and local government surpluses have been quite stable, varying in the narrow range between
0 and 1% of GDP during the past four decades; during this same time, the Federal government surplus has exhibited far
greater variability, ﬂuctuating between 1% and -6% of GDP. Of course the state/local aggregate conceals variation among
individual components, but in general both the magnitude and variability of state/local debt is far smaller than for Federal
government debt. The latter is therefore of much greater importance for macroeconomic analysis of ﬁscal policy, and its
time-series properties are very diﬀerent, as well.
4Given the complexity of the political and market constraints under which municipal authorities operate, it
is diﬃcult to justify strong prior expectations about which particular form of adjustment must dominate,
and our goal here is to examine the dynamics of ﬁscal adjustment with a minimum of prior structure.
We do this using a vector error-correction approach, outlined in Section 2. Section 3 describes our data
in greater detail, and veriﬁes in particular that they are consistent with a modeling approach relying on
the stationarity of the deﬁcit; it also describes the basic estimation approach. Section 4 presents the
results of the empirical analysis, using the entire sample. These results indicate that municipalities make
diﬀerent types of ﬁscal adjustment in response to diﬀerent origins of ﬁscal imbalances. For example, among
other results, we ﬁnd that higher municipal public spending is typically followed by oﬀsetting expenditure
changes in subsequent periods, with relatively modest adjustments in other ﬁscal variables; by contrast,
innovations to municipal revenue tend to persist and to be followed by substantial changes in municipal
spending.
Because our sample contains a large cross-section of municipalities, it is possible to analyze sub-samples
separately. Section 5 reports the results from two such analyses. In the ﬁrst, cities are categorized by
population size, and in the second, by their initial level of debt. For reasons of institutional structure and
political economy, the incentives for ﬁscal adjustment facing large cities may diﬀer signiﬁcantly from those
for small cities.7 For similar reasons, the adjustment process may also diﬀer with the current level of debt.
Our analysis indicates, indeed, that the process of ﬁscal adjustment does diﬀer signiﬁcantly across these
7To oﬀer only one of many possible reasons why ﬁscal adjustment may vary by city size, we note that it is commonplace for
states to create administrative distinctions among cities based on population size; cities of the “ﬁrst class”, for example, are
those with the largest populations, the next size category deﬁnes the cities of the “second class”, and so forth. These distinc-
tions are used in state laws and regulations deﬁning the powers and responsibilities of municipalities. Purely administrative
considerations aside, the political and economic importance of cities may inﬂuence their policymaking, too. The preamble
to the Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperation Authority Act for Cities of the First Class, Laws of Pennsylvania, Act
1991-6, Session of 1991, Section 102, a law which set up elaborate ﬁnancing (a “bailout”) and ﬁscal control mechanisms
for Philadelphia during its ﬁscal crisis in the 1990s, exempliﬁes the potential importance of city size: “It is hereby declared
to be a public policy of the Commonwealth ... to foster the ﬁscal integrity of cities of the ﬁrst class to assure that these
cities provide for the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens; pay principal and interest owed on their debt obligations
when due; meet ﬁnancial obligations to their employees, vendors, and suppliers; and provide for proper ﬁnancial planning
procedures and budgeting practices. The inability of a city of the ﬁrst class to provide essential services to its citizens as a
result of a ﬁscal emergency is hereby determined to aﬀect adversely the health, safety, and welfare not only of the citizens
of that municipality but also of other citizens in this Commonwealth.” “Cities of the ﬁrst class” in Pennsylvania are those
with populations in excess of 1.5 million. Philadelphia is the only city in this class; the second largest city in the state is
Pittsburgh, with a population of less than .4 million. This example also illustrates how heavily-indebted cities may face
political or market pressures that diﬀer from those with low levels of debt.
5subsamples.
Section 6 concludes with a summary of the main ﬁndings and discusses some of the many directions for
interesting future research that these ﬁndings suggest.
2 A Framework for Analysis of Fiscal Adjustment
Without imposing any prior restrictions, the budgetary adjustment pattern could be modeled empirically
by means of a vector autoregression capturing the development of ﬁscal ﬂows like revenues, expenditures,
and debt service as well as their interrelationship over time. Although adjustments might take place in
principle at any future date, a now-standard approach in macroeconomic analysis is to ﬁt a statistical
model to the time series involved, and to argue that it captures all signiﬁcant correspondences between
the variables at diﬀerent points in time. Thus, empirical analyses restrict attention to a limited number
of periods deﬁned by the choice of the lag length of the statistical model. Once an empirical model is
obtained, it is possible to explore whether and how budgetary adjustments actually take place. However,
if municipalities, on average, pursue a ﬁscal policy consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint,
budgetary components will display a cointegrating relationship, and, hence, the deﬁcit will be stationary
(e.g., Trehan and Walsh, 1988). In order to model the adjustment to ﬁscal innovations, one can exploit
this stochastic implication of the intertemporal budget constraint and employ a vector error-correction
framework, relating the change of expenditures, revenues, and debt service to the lagged deﬁcit. Bohn
(1991) conducts such an analysis of ﬁscal policy at the level of the US Federal government, and we utilize
a similar approach at the city level.
In contrast to the usual macro models applied to national governments, however, it is necessary to recognize
that local governments obtain substantial amounts of revenue not only from own-sources like taxes, but
from higher levels of government; in our sample, about 28% of municipal revenue, on average, is obtained
from intergovernmental transfers. Furthermore, as already pointed out in the introduction, those transfers
may be crucial in restoring the balance of the budget. We therefore explicitly decompose the revenue side
of the budget into own-source and intergovernmental revenue.
6Formally, the empirical analysis focuses on a four-dimensional vector of budgetary components Yt =
(Gt;DSt;Rt;Zt)0, where Gt is “primary” government expenditure, DSt denotes the current debt service,
Rt is own-source revenue, and Zt is intergovernmental revenue. The current deﬁcit Dt is determined by
a vector product
Dt ´ b0Yt = Gt + DSt ¡ Rt ¡ Zt; where: b = (1;1;¡1;¡1)0: (1)
Following the literature, the empirical model assumes that the linear combination of the budgetary com-
ponents implied by the current deﬁcit is stationary, and describes the changes of the elements of the vector
Yt as a function of lagged changes of Yt as well as of its lagged level, i.e. the lagged deﬁcit
A(L)∆Yt = ° b0Yt¡1 + ut; (2)
where ∆ is the diﬀerence operator and A(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator. The lagged deﬁcit term
captures the error-correction property of the system, implying that deﬁcits or surpluses lead to budgetary
adjustments reﬂected in ∆Yt. Whereas this approach assumes the stationarity of the deﬁcit, the response
of the system is not constrained a priori and it yields insights about how each of the components of the
ﬁscal policy vector Yt reacts, over time, to innovations ut in itself or in one of the other components.
This system can be used to trace adjustments to budgetary innovations, and, as in a vector autoregressive
(VAR) system, we can compute impulse-response functions. However, as the impulse-response functions
depict the response of the system to innovations in the budgetary components, the intertemporal budget
constraint has a straightforward implication for the present value of the impulse-response functions (Bohn,






where r denotes the given interest rate, the intertemporal budget constraint can be written as
EtPVt (R) + EtPVt (Z) ¡ EtPVt (G) = Bt + Gt + DSt ¡ Rt ¡ Zt; (4)
7where Et denotes the expectation operator as of time t and Bt is the value of the outstanding stock of debt
corresponding to the debt service DSt = rBt. Accordingly, the expected present value of future primary
surpluses is equal to the current value of the debt and the current deﬁcit. To obtain a relationship in ﬂows
this expression is transformed into8
EtPVt (∆R) + EtPVt (∆Z) ¡ EtPVt (∆G) = Gt + DSt ¡ Rt ¡ Zt; (5)
which states that the expected present value of all future changes in the components of the primary surplus
is just suﬃcient to cover the current deﬁcit including interest. Let b Xt denote the innovation in a variable
Xt, i.e., the change in its expected value.9 Rewriting equation (5) in terms of innovations yields
d PV t (∆R) + d PV t (∆Z) ¡ d PV t (∆G) = b Gt + d DSt ¡ b Rt ¡ b Zt: (6)
Accordingly, the innovations in the budgetary components on the right-hand side should evoke an oﬀsetting
linear combination of innovations in the present value of the responses.
More speciﬁcally, based on an estimate of system (2) we can compute the present value of the projected
changes of each budgetary component in response to innovations in itself and in any other budgetary com-
ponent. Formally, the present value of changes in the j-th element of the vector of budgetary components
can be computed as a weighted sum of innovations
d PV t (∆Y [j]) =
X
i
¼ (Y [i];Y [j]) b Y [i]t ; (7)
where ¼ (Y [i];Y [j]) denotes the marginal eﬀect of an innovation in the i-th budgetary component.10
Following equation (6) we expect that a unit innovation in each of the budgetary components triggers
8Following Bohn (1991) the transformation uses
r¡1 (1 + r)[EtPVt (∆X) + Xt] = EtPVt (X) + Xt:
9Formally b Xt is deﬁned as b Xt ´ EtXt ¡ Et¡1Xt.
10In terms of standard VAR analysis ¼ (Y [i];Y [j]) is obtained as the present value of the impulse response function of
variable Y [j] given a unit innovation in variable Y [i]. Note that the orthogonality of the innovations is not required.
8oﬀsetting responses of the components of the primary surplus
¼ (Y [i];R) + ¼ (Y [i];Z) ¡ ¼ (Y [i];G) = b[i]; (8)
where b[i] is positive for i = 1;2, i.e. for expenditures and debt service, and negative for i = 3;4, i.e. for
revenues (cf. equation 1).
Since equation (8) follows from the deﬁnition of the intertemporal budget constraint, one might think of
it as an exact empirical relationship. However, aside from possible inconsistencies in the data, this is not
necessarily the case. Whereas the underlying intertemporal budget constraint (4) assumes a given interest
rate to discount future budgetary ﬂows, the interest rate is generally not known with certainty, and it may
also vary over time. In addition, as discussed further below, the data display signiﬁcant variation in the
size of municipalities, which requires scaling ﬁscal variables in per-capita terms. As a consequence, the
appropriate discount rate is a function of both the interest rate as well as the rate of population growth
and, hence, diﬀers from the interest rate.11 Finally, it should be noted that Bt is more generally deﬁned
as the net ﬁscal debt position, but empirical data will typically fail to account in a comprehensive way for
all assets held by the government. However, despite these qualiﬁcations, it turns out that the adjustment
pattern found in the present study follows the predictions of equations (6) and (8) rather closely.
3 Data and Estimation Approach
3.1 Data
The empirical investigation employs annual data for individual municipalities from all over the U.S. ob-
tained from the Census of Governments (COG). In order to trace budgetary adjustments across time the
analysis focuses on a subsample of all cities reported in the COG yielding a balanced panel for 1270 cities



































where f PV t (X) is deﬁned as in (3) except for a discount rate e r = (r ¡ n)=(1 + n): As compared to equation (6) there is an
additional term capturing the reduction of the per-capita debt due to population growth.
9Table 1: Deﬁnition of Fiscal Variables
Variable Components (COG categories)
(i) Own Revenue (Rt) Total Taxes, Total General Charges,
Total Miscellaneous General Revenue
excluding Interest Revenue.
(ii) Vertical Grants (Zt) Intergovernmental Revenue
from Federal Government
and from State Governments
(iii) General Expenditure (Gt) Total General Expenditure
including Intergovernmental Expenditure
net of Local Intergovernmental Revenue,
and excluding Interest on General Debt.
(iv) Debt Service (DSt) Total Interest on General Debt
net of Interest Revenue
(v) General Deﬁcit (Dt) (iii) + (iv) - (i) - (ii)
over 26 years from 1972 to 1997.12 The dataset comprises four ﬁscal variables, which are constructed from
the COG classiﬁcation (excluding utilities and insurance trusts) (see Table 1). There are two revenue vari-
ables, own-source revenue and intergovernmental revenue obtained from higher-level governments. There
are also two variables on the expenditure side, general expenditure and net debt-service expenditures. In
addition to ﬁscal transfers from higher-level governments, small amounts of municipal expenditures and
revenues are payments to or receipts from other local governments; the net amount of these payments is
included as part of general expenditure. Many municipalities hold signiﬁcant interest-bearing ﬁnancial
assets, but, since asset values are not always reported in the data, it is not possible to determine net
indebtedness. It is therefore preferable to utilize the ﬂow of net debt service.
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics with ﬁscal variables scaled in terms of population size. The
mean of real per-capita expenditures is $756. There is however strong variation with a standard deviation
of $534. The debt service, deﬁned net of interest earnings, shows a mean around zero. The ﬁgures for
expenditure correspond to the mean values on the revenue side, i.e. own revenue of $553 and intergovern-
mental revenues of $213. The mean of the residual diﬀerence between the ﬁrst four components (denoted
12Although the data are available in digital form, their preparation for analysis is non-trivial, particularly because they are
not coded uniformly across years. The ﬁnal data have been checked for consistency with state-level aggregates reported in
Census publications. The Census Bureau makes occasional revisions in these data without, however, updating the publicly-
available data. Since the revisions by the Census Bureau are not reported, preliminary regressions have been run to detect
inﬂuential observations. If a further inspection of these observations revealed apparent inconsistencies with previous and
subsequent observations, the corresponding city was completely removed from the dataset. As a result, from the 1346 cities
in the basic balanced sample 76 cities have been removed.
10Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. Median
Fiscal variables Levels per capita, 1972-1997
Own Revenue 0.553 0.399 0.004 7.501 0.445
General Expenditure 0.756 0.534 0.005 7.826 0.596
Vertical Grants 0.213 0.233 0.000 3.150 0.136
Debt Service (net) 0.002 0.051 -0.530 1.104 -0.000
General Deﬁcit -0.008 0.164 -1.771 2.464 -0.018
Annual change per capita, 1973-1997
Own Revenue 0.014 0.102 -1.441 1.486 0.009
General Expenditure 0.017 0.191 -2.348 2.485 0.011
Vertical Grants 0.004 0.104 -1.412 1.610 0.000
Debt Service (net) -0.001 0.032 -0.527 0.463 -0.001
Other variables 1972-1997
Income in $10,000 per capita 1.920 0.516 0.722 6.737 1.838
Population (in 1,000) 74.77 267.1 0.671 7922 31.38
Statistics for pooled observations for 1270 cities in prices of 1996 (deﬂated with common US GDP deﬂator). Fiscal variables
in $ 1,000 per-capita.
as general government deﬁcit) is at minus $8, indicating that on average the cities run a small surplus.
However, there is marked variation in the sample between a deﬁcit of as much as $2,464 and a surplus
of $1,771. This variation in budget outcomes is also reﬂected in diﬀerences in the debt service, where
some cities show high spending whereas others actually report positive net interest earnings. The ﬁscal
variables show modest mean values of annual growth in expenditures ($17 per capita) and revenues, and
again substantial variation between rather large extremes.
The bottom of Table 2 reports statistics for population and income showing that the average population
size is around 75,000. Population size ranges from below 1,000 to almost 8 million (New York City)
indicating strong variation in the dataset.13 Thus, to model the ﬁscal adjustment process, ﬁscal variables
should be scaled with the size of the considered jurisdiction; since income data are only available at the
county level the analysis utilizes per-capita ﬁgures.14 However, variations in absolute population size are
used in Section 5 to decompose the sample in order to determine whether there are important diﬀerences
13The population data reported in the COG public use ﬁles do not corresponding strictly to the year of the ﬁscal data.
In addition, they are generally not updated on an annual basis. Therefore, the population data have been smoothed by a
moving average using a cubic trend polynomial (Kendall and Stuart, 1976:381f).
14The income ﬁgures report per-capita income for the corresponding county or county area as reported by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis.
11Table 3: Panel Unit Root Tests
lag order (p) 3 4 5 6
Own Revenue -2.11 -1.94 -2.00 -1.80
Gen. Expend. -2.21 ? -2.03 ? -1.98 -1.86
Vert. Grants -2.53 ? -2.28 ? -2.16 ? -1.91
Debt Service -2.33 ? -2.19 ? -2.13 ? -1.95 ?
General Deﬁcit -1.81 ? -1.60 ? -1.56 ? -1.38 ?
∆ Own Revenue -2.21 ? -1.88 ? -1.84 ? -1.64 ?
∆ Gen. Expend. -2.40 ? -2.02 ? -1.85 ? -1.65 ?
∆ Vert. Grants -2.66 ? -2.21 ? -2.05 ? -1.78 ?
∆ Debt Service -2.38 ? -2.10 ? -1.97 ? -1.73 ?
Average of augmented Dickey Fuller statistics. With the exception of the deﬁcit, tests for variables in levels include a linear
trend. A star denotes signiﬁcant rejection of non-stationarity at the 5 % level according to a standardization using means
and variances tabulated by Im et al. (2002, Table 3).
in the budgetary adjustment pattern in large and small cities.
3.2 Unit-Root Tests
The empirical literature dealing with aggregate budgetary revenue and spending data at the macroeco-
nomic level has emphasized that the corresponding time series typically display non-stationarity. Although
the basic system (as described in Section 2) is formulated in ﬁrst diﬀerences and thus takes account of
possible non-stationarity of the individual budgetary components, it is important to show that their linear
relationship as expressed by the current deﬁcit is in fact stationary. In the present context, the presence of
only 26 years of data may call into question the validity of standard tests for non-stationarity at the level
of the individual municipality. For that reason, unit-root testing is carried out using a statistic suggested
by Im et al. (2002) which is based on the full set of unit-root statistics for each of the individual munici-
palities. As this approach assumes independence of observations, the common component is removed by
subtracting the cross-sectional averages from each observation. Table 3 reports statistics for the four bud-
getary components. Since many individual cities display substantial growth or decline in ﬁscal variables
over the 26-year sample, it is appropriate to assume a linear time trend in tests for variables in levels.
However, for the deﬁcit, the existence of a trend would conﬂict with the intertemporal budget constraint.
12It turns out that for the own-revenue series non-stationarity of the level cannot be rejected, and the same
is true for the level of expenditures and grants in tests based on higher-order serial autocorrelation.15
Stationarity can be rejected, however, for the deﬁcit, and it can also be rejected for the ﬁrst diﬀerences
of all of the four budgetary components. This supports the speciﬁcation of budgetary adjustments along
the lines of a VECM model.
3.3 Estimation Approach
It is diﬃcult to investigate long-run adjustments in a vector of four ﬁscal instruments for individual cities
with only 26 years of observations. However, the large cross-sectional dimension of the dataset enhances
possibilities for empirical modeling by pooling observations for individual cities. Typically, panel data
studies allow for individual eﬀects capturing diﬀerences in the characteristics of individual units.16 The
following analysis deals essentially with ﬁrst diﬀerences of ﬁscal ﬂow variables, and, in this respect, will
not be aﬀected by cross-sectional diﬀerences in local characteristics. The ﬁscal deﬁcit variable, however,
is entered in levels. The presence of individual eﬀects would imply that the jurisdictions converge to
diﬀerent (per-capita) deﬁcit levels. Formal tests for the presence of individual eﬀects are used below to
determine whether jurisdictions are commonly converging toward the same surplus or deﬁcit value. If no
indication of individual eﬀects is found, it is appropriate to estimate individual equations of the system
(2) separately with OLS; in this case, joint estimation does not improve eﬃciency as the set of regressors
is the same across equations.17
Estimation of the VECM (2) requires speciﬁcation of the lag length of the model. Given the limited
overall time dimension of the dataset (26 years), we begin with a lag of 4 years in the diﬀerenced data,
subsequently testing for possible reductions in the number of lags. As shown in Table 4, a reduction of
15Note that the optimal lag length according to the Akaike criterion diﬀers between individual municipalities, but in the
majority of cases is not larger than 6.
16In samples with relatively short time series, this raises issues about properly estimating the dynamic relationships. The
literature on dynamic panel data has emphasized biasedness of standard panel data approaches in the presence of lagged
endogenous variables and suggests the use of instrumental techniques (e.g., Holtz-Eakin et al., 1991). With the rather long
time period available in our sample, the Nickell (1981) bias should not be a signiﬁcant problem, and it is neglected in the
tests for the presence of individual eﬀects.
17Avery (1977) has emphasized that in the presence of individual error components, estimation of individual equations
separately is not eﬃcient and proposed simultaneous estimation techniques (see, also, Baltagi, 1995:103pp).
13Table 4: Speciﬁcation Tests
lag length 2 3 4
indiv.eﬀ (Â2 (5076)) 4019 4186 4437
lag order reduction (Â2 (16)) 1518 711.0 571.7
Likelihood ratio statistics on cross-equation restrictions.
the lag length is always rejected. This suggests employing a model with four lags.18
Comparing estimation with and without individual eﬀects it turns out that joint tests reject the presence of
individual eﬀects, regardless of lag lengths.19 As pointed out above, this indicates that cities are commonly
converging toward the same level of deﬁcit and estimation can be carried out without individual eﬀects.20
4 Estimation Results
Since the system is a four-dimensional vector error-correction model, estimation produces a large number of
parameters. Central parameters are the coeﬃcients of the error-correction term in the individual equations.
As shown in Table 5, the results clearly conﬁrm convergence toward the intertemporal budget constraint,
since a higher deﬁcit shows a positive impact on own revenue and on grants received, whereas a higher
deﬁcit shows a negative impact on expenditures. The positive impact on debt service is consistent with the
fact that the deﬁcit results in a rise in debt levels and thus creates higher debt service in the subsequent
period. Given a constant rate of interest, and in the absence of population growth, the coeﬃcient of the
deﬁcit in the debt service equation should reﬂect the real interest rate.21
18Note that estimates of models with 5 and 6 lags (available upon request) did not show major diﬀerences in the impulse
response functions.
19Testing is carried out using individual ﬁxed eﬀects for all equations since Hausman tests rejected the use of a random
eﬀects model for the own-source revenue and expenditure equations.
20As part of innovations in budgetary components may be common across jurisdictions one might also think of employing
time-speciﬁc eﬀects. But this would imply conditioning on common shocks and modeling only adjustments to idiosyncratic
innovations, although the intertemporal budget constraint requires adjustments to all innovations. Moreover, the inclusion
of time eﬀects would tend to limit the comparability between the results for diﬀerent subsamples as carried out below.
21With a constant rate of interest r, and denoting the rate of change in population with n, the change in debt service






















14Table 5: Estimates for ECM Term
Equation ° (Std.err.)
Own Revenue :098 (.013)
Gen. Expend. ¡:297 (.018)
Debt Service :013 (.003)
Vert. Grants :069 (.009)
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.
As discussed in Section 2, the dynamic adjustments can be traced out using impulse-response functions.
The upper panel of Figure 1 depicts the responses to innovations in own revenue while the lower panel
shows the responses to an innovation in grants. The decline in own revenue in the upper panel and that
of grants in the lower panel indicates that only a part of an initial innovation in revenues is permanent, in
particular, in the case of an innovation in grants. In both cases, we see a strong response of expenditures
to an innovation in revenues, indicating that most of additional permanent revenues are translated into
higher expenditures. In addition, a signiﬁcant part of the permanent increase in grants is used to reduce
the tax burden.
Figure 2 reports the impulse-response functions for innovations in general expenditures and in debt service.
As the top panel of this ﬁgure shows, a very large part of an innovation to expenditures leads to downward
adjustments of future expenditures rather than to adjustments of revenues. This ﬁnding, together with
the results shown in the top panel of Figure 1, suggests that governments regard adjustments by altering
expenditures as “less costly” than adjustments to own revenues. This conforms also with the strong
adjustment of expenditures to innovations in debt service, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 2.
As the adjustment takes place mainly in the ﬁrst three periods after an innovation, Figures 1 and 2
already provides some information about the long-term responses. However, as discussed in Section 2,
it is instructive to calculate the total ﬁscal responses in present-value terms. For this purpose, we ﬁx
the discount rate at 3 %.22 The columns of Table 6 show the long-run impact of unit innovations in
As population growth shows an average rate of 0.98 % in the sample, the impact of a change in debt per capita on the debt
service is less than proportional to the real interest rate (As noted earlier, even with a constant interest rate this relationship
is only an approximate one, because of the diﬃculty of measuring government assets and liabilities).
22Probably due to the fact that most of the adjustment takes place in the ﬁrst periods, the qualitative results are not
sensitive to the precise value of the discount rate.
15Figure 1: Impulse Responses, Innovation in Revenues
16Figure 2: Impulse Responses, Innovation in Expenditures
17per-capita values of the ﬁscal variables, expressed in present-value terms. The table also displays standard
errors obtained by sampling from the normal joint distribution of the VECM estimates and computing the
corresponding distribution in the impulse-response functions as suggested by Sims (1987) and Hamilton
(1994:337).23
It is instructive to review the ﬁndings reported in Table 6 from two diﬀerent perspectives. Reading down
the columns of the table shows how innovations in any one ﬁscal variable aﬀect the subsequent adjustments
of itself and the other variables. Comparing across the rows indicates which ﬁscal variables tend to be
more responsive or sensitive to changes in the others. Consider ﬁrst the own revenue column. It shows
that an innovation to own revenue by $1 leads to an increase in future expenditures by 50.8 cents and to
reductions of own revenue and grants by 34.8 cents and 8.6 cents respectively (all in present value terms).
As part of the adjustment to a change in each of the ﬁscal variables takes the form of an oﬀsetting change
in its own future value, it is helpful to assess the response to a permanent $1 increase in each variable.
Dividing by the permanent component of the innovation in own revenue (1 ¡:348), it turns out that 78.0
cents of a permanent increase in own revenue are translated into higher spending (cf. the bottom panel of
Table 6), whereas intergovernmental grants are reduced by 13.1 cents.
Following the predictions of equation (8), the innovations in each of the budgetary components will be
fully balanced in the present value of changes in own revenue, grants, and expenditures, which make up the
primary surplus. Indeed, summing across the ﬁrst three rows in the ﬁrst column the estimated response to
an additional dollar of own revenue is oﬀsetting as much as 94.2 cents by changes in the primary surplus.
Computing the present value of adjustments in the primary surplus to innovations in expenditures and
grants yields similar ﬁgures of 95.9 % and 95.5 %, respectively. For innovations in debt service the sum
of the present value of changes in expenditures, revenues, and grants is much lower (56.4 %). But, here,
future changes in the debt service play a major role in balancing the budget, indicating strong temporal
ﬂuctuations in the debt service. With regard to permanent increases in the debt service the present value
response of the primary surplus amounts to 91.9 %. Given that the intertemporal budget constraint
23Sims (1987) argues that a possible deﬁciency of this approach is that it ignores the randomness of the estimated covariance
matrix of the errors. However, in the current context, this estimate is obtained from a large cross-section as in seemingly
unrelated regression analysis. Note that the sampling is carried out using a heteroscedasticity consistent estimate of the
variance-covariance matrix of the VECM.
18Table 6: Implied Present Value Responses
Response Innovation to
Own Revenue Gen. Expend. Vert. Grants Debt Service
Own Revenue -.348 (.026) .162 (.019) -.144 (.023) .145 (.037)
Gen. Expend. .508 (.027) -.716 (.020) .338 (.027) -.370 (.037)
Vert. Grants -.086 (.012) .082 (.010) -.473 (.017) .049 (.016)
Debt Service -.005 (.005) .019 (.004) -.015 (.004) -.387 (.014)
response to permanent increase
Own Revenue .571 (.040) -.273 (.044) .236 (.059)
Gen. Expend. .780 (.021) .641 (.043) -.604 (.063)
Vert. Grants -.131 (.019) .287 (.033) .079 (.026)
Debt Service -.008 (.008) .068 (.014) -.028 (.008)
Standard errors in parentheses obtained by sampling from the normal joint distribution of the VECM estimates based on a
heteroscedasticity consistent estimate of the variance-covariance matrix.
holds only approximately in empirical data, as the true interest rate, its time path, and the amount of
non-interest bearing assets of the municipalities are not known, these ﬁgures are indicative of reasonable
properties of the empirical model of municipal ﬁscal adjustment.
But, the results also indicate that jurisdictions do not respond solely with the components of their primary
surplus to innovations in budgetary components. A small but statistically signiﬁcant fraction of additional
grants, 2.8 cents out of a permanent increase by $1, is used to lower the debt burden. In addition, an
increase in expenditures is followed by an increase in debt service by 6.8 cents per dollar of additional
permanent expenditures. Note that these ﬁgures imply quite substantial changes in terms of the stock of
the debt.
Generally, the results show that innovations in the components of the budget tend to be partly oﬀset
by future changes in the same component. This is particularly true for expenditures, where more than
two thirds of a change are balanced with an oﬀsetting change in the present value of future expenditures.
Considering permanent innovations in budgetary components, Table 6 displays a key role of expenditures
for ﬁscal adjustment. Accordingly, three quarters of a dollar in additional own revenue and almost two
thirds of a dollar in additional grants, are balanced with a corresponding expenditure increase. Also,
changes in the debt service are balanced much more with a corresponding change in expenditures than in
own revenue. Nevertheless, smaller but still signiﬁcant parts of the adjustment are obtained by changes in
19own revenue and grants, in the sense that lower revenues and higher expenses are balanced with signiﬁcant
future increases in own revenue as well as grants.
It may be of interest to relate the response to an innovation in grants to the discussion of the “ﬂypaper”
eﬀect, which argues that the public sector’s propensity to spend out of local personal income is much
lower than the propensity to spend out of grants (for overviews see Gramlich, 1977, and Hines and Thaler,
1997). The results in Table 6 indicate that the response in spending to a permanent increase in grants
by one dollar amounts to 64 cents, which generally is in accordance with the results in the literature (see
Hines and Thaler, 1997). This result diﬀers, however, from Holtz-Eakin et al. (1991) who use a panel
VAR with nine-years to estimate the relationship between the levels of ﬁscal variables, and do not ﬁnd a
positive eﬀect of an innovation in grants on spending.
Reading across the rows in Table 6, one can see that each ﬁscal variable adjusts in the expected direction
to innovations in the others, but by varying degrees. Own revenue, for example, adjusts more strongly
to an innovation in expenditures than to an innovation in grants or debt service. The third row, showing
the response of grants, is of particular interest. Note that ﬁscal transfers from higher-level governments
respond quite signiﬁcantly to innovations in own revenue and expenditures but not very strongly to debt
service burdens. The fact that transfers respond negatively to own revenue and positively to expenditures
is consistent with several common but quite distinct (and not mutually exclusive) hypotheses about inter-
governmental ﬁscal relations. One hypothesis would be that higher-level governments have implemented
programs of ﬁscal transfers that subsidize local expenditures and “tax” local revenues. For example,
with a program of matching grants, higher municipal expenditures would result in larger transfers. The
responses revealed in the table would then reﬂect the operation of these policies. Another hypothesis,
related but distinct, would be that the institutions of intergovernmental ﬁscal relations are structured
in such a way that shocks to local ﬁscal variables, perhaps arising from exogenous ﬂuctuations in local
economic conditions, trigger oﬀsetting adjustments by higher-level governments that use either automatic
or discretionary transfer mechanisms to help insure localities from such shocks, thus pooling “ﬁscal risks”
among cities. (Programs of equalizing ﬁscal transfers, which provide smaller amounts of assistance to
municipalities with strong and growing revenue bases as compared to those with weaker revenue systems,
20would have very similar impacts.) In accordance with this view, our results conﬁrm that innovations in
revenues are partly oﬀset by vertical grants. As a third hypothesis, one might conjecture that higher-level
governments adapt their ﬁscal transfer policies so as to assist cities that are experiencing “ﬁscal stress”,
as indicated by positive innovations in expenditures and negative innovations in revenues. The responses
displayed in the table might then suggest that localities face “soft” budget constraints that enable them to
manipulate their policies so as to induce accommodating ﬁscal transfers. Whichever of these hypotheses
may be true – and a standard VAR or VECM is not designed to distinguish among them – it is impor-
tant to note that the mechanisms of ﬁscal adjustment diﬀer among ﬁscal variables: the response of ﬁscal
transfers to an innovation in debt service is substantially smaller in magnitude than the response to an
innovation in local spending and revenues. We shall discuss this issue further in the next section.
5 Sample Decompositions
The results in the preceding section have revealed a number of interesting features of the dynamics of
ﬁscal adjustment for US municipalities. However, although it is certainly useful and instructive to study
the entire sample of cities, our data set is suﬃciently large that further analysis can be undertaken. In this
section, we examine subsets of municipalities in an attempt to uncover potentially important diﬀerences
in the nature of the adjustment process for diﬀerent types of cities. We explore two potentially important
dimensions: city size and the initial debt burden of the cities.
5.1 Fiscal Adjustment and City Size
The dataset shows remarkably strong variation in terms of population size. The cross-sectional nature of
this variation is highlighted by the ﬁnding that 86% of the variation in population in 1997 can be explained
in a regression on the 1972 ﬁgures. If the sample is decomposed by average population size over the entire
sample period, does one ﬁnd important diﬀerences in the adjustment pattern across city size?
Results from estimating the system separately for cities in three size groups are reported in Table 7. The
ﬁrst group (the bottom quartile of cities by size) consists of 318 cities with populations between 1 and 15
21Table 7: Decomposition with Respect to City Size
Response Innovation to
Own Revenue Gen. Expend. Vert. Grants Debt Service
small cities (bottom 25%)
Own Revenue -.420 (.047) .204 (.040) -.188 (.049) .306 (.082)
Gen. Expend. .443 (.049) -.696 (.039) .262 (.051) -.319 (.084)
Vert. Grants -.075 (.023) .056 (.018) -.502 (.029) -.018 (.034)
Debt Service -.002 (.008) .015 (.006) -.012 (.007) -.337 (.027)
response to permanent increase
Own Revenue .673 (.070) -.378 (.097) .462 (.117)
Gen. Expend. .765 (.044) .525 (.094) -.482 (.129)
Vert. Grants -.130 (.040) .184 (.059) -.027 (.051)
Debt Service -.004 (.014) .050 (.020) -.025 (.014)
medium-sized cities (25th–75th percentiles)
Own Revenue -.300 (.034) .137 (.020) -.102 (.022) .087 (.047)
Gen. Expend. .561 (.035) -.752 (.023) .380 (.031) -.423 (.047)
Vert. Grants -.083 (.015) .082 (.012) -.473 (.023) .043 (.021)
Debt Service -.003 (.008) .018 (.006) -.010 (.007) -.402 (.019)
response to permanent increase
Own Revenue .529 (.048) -.194 (.043) .146 (.078)
Gen. Expend. .801 (.024) .721 (.040) -.707 (.082)
Vert. Grants -.118 (.022) .319 (.038) .072 (.035)
Debt Service -.004 (.012) .070 (.025) -.019 (.014)
large cities (top 75%)
Own Revenue -.320 (.062) .115 (.031) -.132 (.039) .058 (.079)
Gen. Expend. .511 (.069) -.696 (.039) .404 (.057) -.298 (.084)
Vert. Grants -.112 (.026) .148 (.023) -.424 (.040) .180 (.037)
Debt Service -.014 (.010) .029 (.007) -.033 (.008) -.408 (.025)
response to permanent increase
Own Revenue .380 (.075) -.230 (.071) .098 (.132)
Gen. Expend. .752 (.048) .702 (.069) -.503 (.144)
Vert. Grants -.165 (.044) .487 (.060) .304 (.063)
Debt Service -.021 (.015) .096 (.026) -.057 (.015)
Sample decomposition based on the quartiles of the long-run distribution of population. Standard errors in parentheses
obtained by sampling from the normal joint distribution of the VECM estimates based on a heteroscedasticity consistent
estimate of the variance-covariance matrix.
22thousand, the second group consists of 635 cities with populations between 15 and 62 thousand, and the
third group (the top quartile by size) comprises 317 cities with populations between 63 thousand and 7.4
millions. This table reveals several important diﬀerences in the adjustment patterns of cities of diﬀerent
sizes, which, given the rather small standard errors, generally exceed reasonable conﬁdence intervals.
Looking ﬁrst at the ﬁrst column of this table, we note that small cities tend to respond to an innovation in
revenues more with a reduction of future revenues than with higher spending, as compared with medium
size and large cities. As reported in the second column, small cities also raise own revenue more in response
to an innovation in expenditures than large jurisdictions. For example, small jurisdictions respond to a
permanent expenditure increase of $1 with an increase in own revenue of about 67 cents whereas large
jurisdictions raise their own revenue by only 38 cents.
By contrast, large cities rely much more on transfers from higher-level governments to ﬁnance permanent
increases in expenditures. For small municipalities, only about 18% of a permanent increase in spending
is ﬁnanced by increased grants, whereas the corresponding ﬁgure for large municipalities is almost 49%.
It is interesting to compare these adjustment responses to the average shares of expenditures ﬁnanced by
grants. Larger jurisdictions, on average, depend more on grants: grants as a share of expenditures are 31%
for large cities and only 26% for small cities. For large cities, then, innovations in municipal expenditures
are even more substantially ﬁnanced by increased intergovernmental transfers than the already relatively
high average share of grants in total expenditures suggests. Conversely, for smaller cities, innovations
in municipal expenditures are even less substantially ﬁnanced through transfers than is indicated by the
relatively low share of grants in total expenditures. Expressed somewhat diﬀerently, the “marginal”
response of grants to innovations in expenditures magniﬁes the existing “average” diﬀerential importance
of grants in the ﬁnances of cities in diﬀerent size categories.
The table also reveals striking diﬀerences in response to higher debt service. Whereas small jurisdictions
tend to ﬁnance additional debt service both by raising revenues and cutting spending rather symmetrically,
larger jurisdictions rely much less on increases in own revenue.
The importance of intergovernmental transfers in ﬁscal adjustments by large cities is also revealed by
comparisons of ﬁgures in the third row of each panel. Across all size categories, grants tend to oﬀset
23innovations in other ﬁscal variables, falling as revenues (both own-source and intergovernmental) rise and
rising as expenditures and debt service increase. However, these eﬀects become more pronounced with
increasing city size, and are markedly higher for large cities, especially for innovations in expenditures
and debt service. The response of ﬁscal transfers to a permanent innovation in debt service is particularly
noteworthy. For small- and medium-sized cities, this eﬀect is essentially negligible, but for large cities,
almost a third of an innovation in debt service is oﬀset by transfers from higher-level governments.
Evidently, then, grants play an unusually important role in the ﬁscal adjustment process for large cities.
It is tempting to view this ﬁnding as evidence of a soft budget constraint for these cities. However,
as noted at the end of the previous section, there are other possible interpretations of this evidence.
For example, suppose that state-level policymakers want to encourage local law-enforcement or public-
health authorities to use new technologies and equipment in order to upgrade public services. One might
conjecture that such initiatives are most easily implemented by encouraging or requiring certain actions on
the part of a relatively few large municipalities, the costs of which are then absorbed, in part, by the state
government, in the form of additional transfers. This might be especially true for initiatives that involve
large capital expenditures and that are ﬁnanced, in the ﬁrst instance, by higher levels of borrowing by large
cities. The present analysis cannot determine whether the diﬀerences in the dynamics of ﬁscal adjustment
for large and small cities reﬂect soft budget constraints, selective implementation of higher-level policy
initiatives through large municipalities, selective pooling of ﬁscal risks for large cities, or still other possible
factors. It does, however, demonstrate that the ﬁscal adjustment process for large cities, especially in its
intergovernmental dimensions, is quite diﬀerent from that for small and medium-sized cities. Evidently,
the institutional structure of intergovernmental ﬁscal relations diﬀers quite substantially among cities of
diﬀerent sizes. One implication of this ﬁnding is that empirical analysis of large cities, useful though
it may be because of their quantitative importance, may lead to ﬁndings that are unrepresentative of
municipalities in general.
245.2 Fiscal Adjustment and Debt Levels
Whereas the intertemporal budget constraint is basically compatible with diﬀerent initial levels of the
debt, governments – or the political and market participants who constrain their behavior – might have
preferences about the level of their debt. In particular, in a stochastic setting, where the local budget is
subject to considerable ﬂuctuations, governments may try to avoid a large amount of debt. This could be
part of a precautionary policy which aims at reducing the risk of not being able to follow a certain policy
agenda in the future. For these reasons, one might expect that budgetary adjustments will diﬀer across
jurisdictions depending on their initial debt burden; in particular, cities with high initial debt burdens
might adjust to innovations in ﬁscal variables in such a way as to reduce their debt, while those with lower
debt levels might have more ﬂexibility to let expenditures rise or to let own-source revenues fall. Transfers
from higher-level governments might also be more forthcoming for cities with higher debt levels, at least
if municipal budget constraints are somewhat “soft”.
Since the net asset position of a government is diﬃcult to assess from the available data, a sample
decomposition is carried out based on a ranking of cities according to the sizes of their initial (net)
debt-service/income ratio. In contrast to population size diﬀerences, which show only minor changes over
time, the level of debt service is much less persistent. Therefore, it would be misleading to carry out a
decomposition of the sample based on long-run averages. The model using four lags in diﬀerences describes
the response to innovations from 1977 to 1997, so the decomposition is carried out using the debt-service
to income ratio in 1976. As with population size, the sample is decomposed into three subsamples. The
ﬁrst consists of 318 cities with a debt-service/income ratio of between -2.2% and -0.05%, i.e. of cities
which are net creditors, the second consists of 635 cities with a ratio between -0.05 % and 0.13 %, and
the third comprises 317 cities with a debt service income ratio between 0.13% and 5.3%. Note that
this decomposition displays almost no overlap with the previous decomposition according to population
size, indicating that there is no strong association between average city size and the debt-service burden
criterion.24
24For instance, from the 317 cities in the high-debt-service category, 79 fall in the large population group, 151 belong to
the medium size group and 87 ﬁt in the small city group. Also formal testing on the contingency table did not reject the
hypothesis of no association.
25Table 8: Decomposition with Respect to Debt-Service Burden
Response Innovation to
Own Revenue Gen. Expend. Vert. Grants Debt Service
small debt-service burden (bottom 25%)
Own Revenue -.359 (.044) .139 (.030) -.143 (.036) .102 (.052)
Gen. Expend. .493 (.046) -.745 (.034) .300 (.047) -.374 (.055)
Vert. Grants -.063 (.021) .043 (.017) -.480 (.033) .017 (.027)
Debt Service .012 (.011) .004 (.010) -.006 (.012) -.433 (.027)
response to permanent increase
Own Revenue .547 (.073) -.275 (.069) .180 (.089)
Gen. Expend. .770 (.038) .577 (.072) -.659 (.099)
Vert. Grants -.098 (.033) .169 (.061) .031 (.047)
Debt Service .018 (.018) .017 (.041) -.011 (.022)
medium debt-service burden (25th–75th percentiles)
Own Revenue -.309 (.042) .191 (.041) -.197 (.046) .104 (.061)
Gen. Expend. .554 (.041) -.704 (.039) .297 (.046) -.449 (.061)
Vert. Grants -.080 (.017) .067 (.018) -.464 (.027) -.007 (.025)
Debt Service -.002 (.007) .019 (.005) -.013 (.005) -.412 (.018)
response to permanent increase
Own Revenue .645 (.076) -.368 (.083) .176 (.102)
Gen. Expend. .802 (.026) .553 (.081) -.762 (.103)
Vert. Grants -.116 (.024) .227 (.064) -.012 (.042)
Debt Service -.003 (.010) .065 (.017) -.024 (.010)
high debt-service burden (top 75%)
Own Revenue -.394 (.044) .153 (.024) -.081 (.030) .270 (.073)
Gen. Expend. .465 (.050) -.711 (.030) .422 (.042) -.240 (.075)
Vert. Grants -.101 (.024) .110 (.016) -.465 (.030) .113 (.033)
Debt Service -.021 (.009) .028 (.006) -.022 (.008) -.334 (.027)
response to permanent increase
Own Revenue .529 (.049) -.152 (.058) .405 (.102)
Gen. Expend. .768 (.044) .789 (.054) -.360 (.116)
Vert. Grants -.166 (.043) .382 (.039) .169 (.049)
Debt Service -.034 (.016) .097 (.022) -.041 (.016)
Sample decomposition based on the initial ratio of net debt service per capita to income per capita. Standard errors in
parentheses obtained by sampling from the normal joint distribution of the VECM estimates based on a heteroscedasticity
consistent estimate of the variance-covariance matrix.
26Table 8 reports the results from estimating the system separately for three subsamples decomposed by size
of initial debt-service burden. It turns out that for cities with a small debt-service burden, no signiﬁcant
reaction in the debt service is found except for innovations in debt-service itself. This indicates that,
except for temporary ﬂuctuations in the debt service, all signiﬁcant budgetary adjustments are carried
out using the components of the primary surplus. According to equation (8) this is exactly what we would
predict from the intertemporal budget constraint. As compared to that we ﬁnd that cities with a medium
or a high debt-service burden do show signiﬁcant responses in the debt service. Since the empirical results
are consistent with the view that cities with a higher debt burden tend to use increases in grants and own
revenue, as well as reductions in expenditures to ﬁnance the repayment of debt, the diﬀerence in the ﬁscal
adjustment patterns can be seen as an indication of a preference of municipalities for lower or zero levels
of debt.
Perhaps most striking are the results relating to changes in grants and to debt service itself, as shown in
the third row of each table. For cities with a high debt-service burden, vertical grants play a larger role
in ﬁscal adjustment. This is particularly apparent from ﬁgures for permanent innovations, where we ﬁnd
that almost 17% of an innovation in own revenue is oﬀset by a reduction in transfers and more than a
third of an innovation in expenditures is ﬁnanced by higher grants. With regard to the response to an
innovation in debt service, note ﬁrst that for cities with a high debt-service burden, a larger part of an
innovation in the debt service reﬂects a permanent increase (for the top category of cities, only one-third
of a debt-service innovation is oﬀset by subsequent reductions in debt-service, whereas there is a more
than 40% oﬀset for others). These more-persistent innovations are ﬁnanced with additional transfers from
higher-level governments to a substantial degree (almost 17%) whereas no eﬀect is found for the reference
group of cities with medium levels of the debt service (about -1%, an order-of-magnitude diﬀerence).
6 Conclusion
As is well-known, non-structural time-series analyses of the sort we have undertaken here cannot be used to
estimate or test for speciﬁc structural relationships. They must therefore be interpreted with considerable
caution. Although the empirical results conﬁrm that innovations in some budgetary components precede
27signiﬁcant future adjustments in others such that ﬁscal balance is maintained, we are not able to identify
the cause of those correspondences. For example, we have seen that innovations in grants are followed by
changes in expenditures. Without further analysis, we cannot, for instance, determine whether (i) new
programs of intergovernmental transfers give rise to additional municipal spending (the policies of higher-
level governments drive those of lower-level governments), (ii) municipal government policymakers demand
and obtain support from higher-level governments for expenditures that they plan to carry out (lower-
level governments drive the policies of higher-level governments), or (iii) fundamental shifts in municipal
conditions (e.g., ﬂight of the middle class from core cities) raise demands for municipal expenditures (e.g.,
social services spending) and create incentives for higher-level governments to assist in the ﬁnancing of
those expenditures. As noted earlier, these types of hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, and diﬀerent
hypotheses may have greater or lesser validity with respect to diﬀerent speciﬁc categories of expenditures,
intergovernmental transfer programs, etc. The signiﬁcant relationships that we have found are nevertheless
suggestive and, by providing evidence of empirical relationships that exist in the data, they indicate
promising directions for further analysis. Many of these relationships have not previously been discerned.
The results point to an important role of expenditures in maintaining intertemporal budget balance. This
is particularly true for innovations in expenditures themselves, where more than two thirds of a change is
balanced with an oﬀsetting change in the present value of future expenditures. But also for innovations
in other budgetary components, including debt service, a signiﬁcant part of adjustment toward budget
balance is due to expenditures. Nevertheless, innovations in budgetary components are also followed by
adjustments on the revenue side. Not only is own revenue raised after an increase in expenditures; grants
from higher-level governments have also been shown to be quite sensitive to changes in municipal spending.
Indeed, intergovernmental transfers seem to “cushion” the process of ﬁscal adjustment for municipalities
more generally, in the sense that higher “primary” expenditures, higher debt service, and lower revenues are
followed by higher grants. While the causation underlying this signiﬁcant response cannot be determined
from the analysis, the role of grants in the ﬁscal adjustment process raises important questions about the
design of the vertical ﬁscal relationships. Since municipalities evidently use “external” funds to balance
their budget, it is possible that this apparent softening of budget constraints distorts local policy decisions.
28A decomposition according to the average population size of the cities documents signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in the estimated responses across subsamples. In particular, in response to changes in expenditures, as
well as in debt service, small cities tend to rely more on own revenue whereas large cities restore budget
balance more by raising revenue from grants. Although these diﬀerences may partly reﬂect the larger
budget share of grants in larger cities, the diﬀerences in the response are much larger than the diﬀerence
in the budget share would suggest. Hence, if vertical grants distort policy choices, this eﬀect may be
particularly relevant for larger cities.
Distinguishing cities according to their initial debt burden, we again ﬁnd diﬀerences in the adjustment
to budgetary changes. As cities with a medium and, in particular, with a large debt burden tend to
use innovations in the budgetary components to reduce their debt service in the future, there is some
support for a convergence toward low levels of debt. Together with the ﬁnding that the aggregate budget
of municipalities shows a small surplus, this indicates that municipalities on average follow a disciplined
and cautious ﬁscal policy. At any rate, similar to the case of large cities, grants are generally found to
play a more important role in maintaining budget balance in cities with a high debt burden.
The statistical methods that we have used do not test for the importance of any particular institutional,
economic, or other determinants of municipal ﬁscal adjustment, but rather shed light on the empirically-
relevant contours of the underlying institutions as revealed in the dynamic adjustment process. The
ﬁndings presented here open up many questions for further analysis. Why should expenditures and
revenues play diﬀerent roles in the dynamic adjustment process for municipalities? Since expenditure levels
seem to be heavily inﬂuenced by changes in revenues, what does this imply about the impact of state-level
regulatory constraints on the types of revenue instruments available to municipalities, or limitations on
their utilization? Would these types of policies or institutional constraints have more signiﬁcant impacts
on municipal spending than, say, budget oversight or review agencies which, at ﬁrst glance, might appear
to be more directly related to expenditure policy? Why should intergovernmental transfers interact with
municipal ﬁnances as they do? Why should ﬁscal adjustment for large cities diﬀer from that of small cities?
And, similarly, why should the ﬁscal adjustment of cities with a signiﬁcant debt burden diﬀer from that of
the others? As indicated in some of the preceding discussion, there are many interesting hypotheses that
29might be examined in an attempt to explain these and other empirical results revealed in our analysis. An
enhanced view of the empirical landscape should be of value in discriminating among competing theoretical
models of local government policymaking in a federal structure, and, ultimately, in understanding better
the complex institutional structures, interacting with underlying economic, demographic, and technological
fundamentals, that produce the observed dynamic ﬁscal adjustment process.
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